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Casenote
The Romberg Imbalance: Mitchell
v. State Upsets the Equilibrium of
Admissible Field Sobriety Test
Results in Georgia*
I. INTRODUCTION

In Mitchell v. State,' a unanimous Georgia Supreme Court held that
the State must provide a scientific foundation for the Romberg Balance
test (Romberg test) before its results are admissible against a defendant
in DUI cases. 2 To satisfy the standard set by the supreme court in Harper
v. State,3 the State must show that a scientific procedure has reached a
"stage of verifiable certainty" to produce reliable results.4 Additionally,
A sincere thank you to Professor John Cole, David Cromer, Gretchen
Connick,
Mary Mahfoud, and Alex Myers for your invaluable input in drafting and editing this
Casenote. Thank you to my family and friends for your continued love and support during
my law school journey. Lastly, thank you Jenny for being my inspiration, my Wonder
Woman, and the love of my life.
1. 301 Ga. 563, 802 S.E.2d 217 (2017).
2. Id. at 567, 802 S.E.2d at 221-22.
3. 249 Ga. 519, 292 S.E.2d 389 (1982).
4. Id. at 524-26, 292 S.E.2d at 395-96. In Harper, the Georgia Supreme Court used
the terms principle,procedure, and technique to describe scientific testing that is subject to
the Harper standard. See id. The court also later applied the Harperstandard to "scientific
test evidence." Carr v. State, 267 Ga. 701, 702-03, 482 S.E.2d 314, 317 (1997). The
interchangeable use of these phrases has previously divided the Georgia Court of Appeals
on when to apply the Harperstandard. See Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Tvrdeich, 268 Ga.
App. 579, 585, 602 S.E.2d 297, 303 (2004) (Adams, J., concurring) (stating Harperand Carr
create "confusion" for courts when interpreting the scope of the Harperstandard). Despite
the inconsistent terminology, the Harper standard has been applied more generally to
evidence "that could only be based on something more than mere observation," Carr, 267
Ga. at 703, 482 S.E.2d at 314, or that "the average layperson could [not] determine for
*
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the State must show that the procedure was "substantially performed ...
in an acceptable manner." 5 The trial court acts as the gatekeeper by
determining the admissibility of a scientific procedure's results under
Harper,6 and may only admit those results after finding that the State
has satisfied both prongs of the Harper standard.7
In DUI cases, there are two categories of field sobriety testing: tests
constituting scientific procedures, which are subject to Harper; and tests
eliciting simple behavioral observations, which are not.8 Before Mitchell,
the Romberg test was uncategorized because Georgia's appellate courts
tended to affirm DUI convictions based on other evidence.9 On appeal
from the denial of his motion to exclude the results of the Romberg test,
Quinton Mitchell argued that the Romberg test fell within the former
category, and the trial court should have conducted a Harper analysis
before admitting the results. 0
The supreme court agreed, stating the Romberg test involved matters
beyond "common sense or experience," and reversed the trial court's
denial of Mitchell's motion." Under Mitchell, the State must now fight
an uphill battle to admit the results of a Romberg test. While trial courts
may take judicial notice of the verifiable certainty of once-novel scientific
procedures, 12 currently the Romberg test lacks the support necessary for
proper judicial notice. 13 Even if courts could take judicial notice of the
Romberg test, the State must also satisfy the second prong of Harperby
showing that the Romberg test was substantially performed in an
acceptable manner.14
Mitchell is just one of the supreme court's recent decisions that have
trended toward harsher admissibility standards for field sobriety test
himself." Al-Amin v. State, 278 Ga. 74, 81, 597 S.E.2d 332, 344 (2004). In this Casenote,
scientific procedure will be used when referring to evidence that requires a scientific
foundation under Harper.
5. Caldwell v. State, 260 Ga. 278, 286-87, 393 S.E.2d 436, 441-42 (1990).
6. Leftwich v. State, 245 Ga. App. 695, 695, 538 S.E.2d 779, 780 (2000).
7. State v. Tousley, 271 Ga. App. 874, 876, 611 S.E.2d 139, 143 (2005).
8. Hawkins v. State, 223 Ga. App. 34, 36-38, 476 S.E.2d 803, 807-08 (1996).
9. See, e.g., Kar v. State, 318 Ga. App. 379, 381, 733 S.E.2d 387, 389-90 (2012)
(holding any error in admitting Romberg evidence was harmless based on other
overwhelming evidence of guilt).
10. Mitchell, 301 Ga. at 564-65, 802 S.E.2d at 220.
11. Id. at 567, 802 S.E.2d at 221-22.
12. See Harper, 249 Ga. at 526, 292 S.E.2d at 396.
13. See Mitchell, 301 Ga. at 567 n.5, 802 S.E.2d at 222 n.5 (citing cases from other
jurisdictions that have various descriptions of the administration, evaluation, and purpose
of the Romberg test).
14. Cf. Tousley, 271 Ga. App. at 878, 611 S.E.2d at 144 (holding the State must satisfy
both prongs of Harperto introduce the results of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test).
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evidence.' 5 These decisions place a heavier burden on the State while
protecting defendants from convictions based on questionable scientific
procedures or evidence acquired through a violation of a defendant's
rights.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On October 5, 2014, a Fayette County sheriffs deputy initiated a
traffic stop after observing Quinton Mitchell fail to maintain his lane.' 6
Upon approaching Mitchell's car, the deputy observed several indicators
of impairment. Specifically, the officer observed the strong odor of alcohol
on Mitchell's person, Mitchell's speech was slurred, and his eyes were
bloodshot and glassy. Mitchell also had difficulty retrieving his license
from his wallet. While Mitchell denied drinking prior to the stop, he
initially refused to perform field sobriety tests. Mitchell relented only
after a Fayetteville police officer, who arrived to assist the deputy,
informed him that he would be arrested if he did not perform the tests.17
The officer then administered a battery of field sobriety tests,
including a Romberg test.' 8 In administering the Romberg test, the
officer instructed Mitchell to "shut his eyes, tilt his head backwards, and
estimate the passage of 30 seconds."' 9 The officer noted that Mitchell was
outside the thirty-second estimation, did not keep his eyes closed, and
swayed back and forth during the test. Mitchell also performed the
horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) and walk-and-turn tests, but declined
to perform the one-leg stand test due to knee problems. The deputy
arrested Mitchell based on his performance on the field sobriety tests, as
well as other observations indicating Mitchell's level of intoxication. 20
Mitchell moved to exclude the results of the Romberg test in the
Fayette County State Court, 21 arguing that, under Harper v. State, the
results of the Romberg test were inadmissible. 22 At the hearing on
Mitchell's motion, the Fayetteville police officer testified that the purpose
15. See Spencer v. State, 302 Ga. 133, 138-39, 805 S.E.2d 886, 890 (2017) (holding the
HGN is not verifiably certain to reliably predict a numerical blood-alcohol content); Olevik
v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 246, 806 S.E.2d 505, 520 (2017) (holding that compelling a suspect to
provide a breath sample violates the suspect's constitutional right against selfincrimination under Georgia's constitution).
16. Mitchell, 301 Ga. at 563, 802 S.E.2d at 219; Appellant's Brief, Mitchell, 301 Ga.
563, 802 S.E.2d 217 (2017) (No. S17A0459), 2016 WL 7365127, at *9.
17. Mitchell, 301 Ga. at 563-64, 802 S.E.2d at 219-20.
18. Id. at 564, 802 S.E.2d at 220.
19. Id. at 566, 802 S.E.2d at 221.
20. Id. at 564, 802 S.E.2d at 219-20.
21. Id. at 564, 802 S.E.2d at 220.
22. Appellant's Brief, supra note 16, at *21.
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of the Romberg test is to gauge a suspect's internal clock for accuracy and
observe eyelid tremors. He claimed that alcohol or drugs could impair a
suspect's ability to perceive time, and that an unimpaired person of
"reasonable faculty" could estimate thirty seconds "within five seconds,
plus or minus." However, he conceded that he was unaware of any studies
confirming the accuracy of the test or the reliability of the five-second
deviation as a measure of impairment. Instead, the extent of the officer's
knowledge of the test stemmed from his participation in drug recognition
expert training. 23 The State provided no further scientific evidence
regarding the Romberg test in opposition to Mitchell's motion.24
The trial court found that the Romberg test was not a scientific
procedure, and the court was not required to conduct a Harperanalysis
before admitting the results of the Romberg test. 25 Mitchell again
contended on appeal that the Romberg test was subject to Harper, and a
unanimous Georgia Supreme Court agreed. 26 The court held that
determining intoxication via the Romberg test, either by eyelid tremors
or the accuracy of a suspect's internal clock, is not a common-sense
matter that would be obvious to a layperson. 27 Thus, the trial court erred
when it failed to determine whether the Romberg test had reached a
scientific stage of verifiable certainty in denying Mitchell's motion, and
that portion of the trial court's order was reversed. 28
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Frye Test Fails to Steady the Admissibility Standardfor
Scientific Evidence in Georgia CriminalCases
Prior to Harper v. State, courts used various admissibility standards
to determine the reliability of certain scientific procedures. 29 Even today,

23. While Georgia courts have discussed the Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) program,
they have not examined the reliability of the training in detail. See, e.g., Duncan v. State,
305 Ga. App. 268, 273, 699 S.E.2d 341, 345-46 (2010) (rejecting the appellant's claim that
"DRE expert evidence is not scientifically reliable"). In Williams v. State, 710 So. 2d 24 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998), the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida thoroughly detailed the
history of DRE training and the twelve steps used by officers to determine if a suspect is
impaired, which includes administering the Romberg Balance test. See id. at 26-27, 26-27
nn.3-6.
24. Mitchell, 301 Ga. at 566-67, 802 S.E.2d at 221.
25. Id. at 565, 802 S.E.2d at 220.

26. Id.
27. Id. at 567, 802 S.E.2d at 221-22.
28. Id. at 567, 802 S.E.2d at 222.
29. See, e.g., Salisbury v. State, 221 Ga. 718, 719-20, 146 S.E.2d 776, 777 (1966)
(holding lie detector test evidence is inadmissible because the device's "reliability and
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Georgia maintains a long-standing general rule that foundational
evidence via expert testimony on "any question of science, skill, trade, or
like questions" is always admissible in criminal cases. 30 This rule
remained relatively unshaken until Harper,31 where the Georgia
Supreme Court narrowed the admissibility standard regarding the
results of novel scientific procedures. 32 However, the nebulous case law
prior to Harperchallenged trial courts to come up with their own methods
of determining the reliability of certain scientific procedures. 33
Some courts echoed the reasoning of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Frye v. United StateS 34 to
lessen the potential harmful impact of evidence rooted in novel areas of
science. 35 In Frye, the court held that the systolic blood pressure
deception test-a test designed to measure the influence of emotional
triggers on a subject's blood pressure-had not gained enough
recognition in the scientific community to warrant admitting its results
into evidence. 36

technique have not yet gained scientific acceptance"); Emmett v. State, 232 Ga. 110, 115,
205 S.E.2d 231, 235 (1974) (holding the reliability of evidence produced by the defendant
undergoing a hypnotic trance "has not been established").
30. O.C.G.A. § 24-7-707 (2017); see also, e.g., McDowell v. State, 78 Ga. App. 116, 12021, 50 S.E.2d 633, 637 (1948) (relying on the same "always admissible" standard to affirm
the admission of an undertaker's expert testimony). The Georgia General Assembly
maintained this rule when it adopted a modified version of the Federal Rules of Evidence
in 2011. See David N. Dreyer, F. Beau Howard & Amy M. Leitch, Dancing with the Big
Boys: Georgia Adopts (Most of) the Federal Rules of Evidence, 63 MERCER L. REV 1, 39-40
(2011).
31. Courts generally reasoned that any questionable evidence regarding an area of
science would be resolved by the jury. See, e.g., Hilliard v. State, 92 Ga. App. 294, 296, 88
S.E.2d 425, 427 (1955) ("The jury may deal with such [evidence] as they see fit, giving
credence to it or not.").
32. See Harper, 249 Ga. at 525, 292 S.E.2d at 395.
33. See, e.g., id. at 524, 292 S.E.2d at 394. In Harper, the trial court determined that
expert testimony was not admissible because "the reliability of the [procedure in question]
had not been established with enough certainty to authorize [the testimony] to be admitted
in evidence." Id.
34. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by FED. R. EVID. 702 as recognized in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1993).
35. See, e.g., Salisbury, 221 Ga. at 719-20, 146 S.E.2d at 777. Prior to the decision by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Daubert, many other jurisdictions used the Frye
test to curtail the admissibility of evidence created by "novel scientific methods." See Joel
Howe, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: The Rules of the Game Are Changed-Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., Eleventh Circuit Survey, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1395,
1397 (1994).
36. Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14.
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Under the Frye test, results of a scientific procedure were only
admissible if they were generally accepted in the scientific community.37
Although mentioned in some cases involving similar evidence, the Frye
test was never expressly adopted in Georgia.38 It was not until Harper
that trial courts were given definitive guidance on how to approach
evidence based on less-established scientific methods.
B. The Georgia Supreme Court Builds a SturdierAdmissibility
Standard
The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the Frye standard in Harper,
stating that the Frye test "is not an appropriate way to determine the
admissibility of a scientific procedure." 39 On appeal from his murder
conviction, Harper argued that a psychologist should have been allowed
to testify as to statements Harper made while under the influence of
sodium amytal, or "truth serum." While the psychologist testified that
using sodium amytal was an accepted medical and psychological practice,
he was not allowed to testify that Harper denied killing the victim while
under its effects. 40
The supreme court held that the psychologist's testimony was
inadmissible because the use of sodium amytal was not verifiably certain
to provide reliable evidence that Harper's statements were truthful.4 1
Under Harper, a scientific procedure must have reached a "scientific
stage of verifiable certainty" for its results to be admissible. 42 To make
this determination, trial courts may rely on expert testimony, exhibits,
treatises, or case law from other jurisdictions regarding the reliability of
37. Id. at 1014.
38. See Salisbury, 221 Ga. at 719-20, 146 S.E.2d at 777 (citing passively to Frye in
holding that the results of a polygraph test were inadmissible); Blount v. Moore, 159 Ga.
App. 80, 86-87, 282 S.E.2d 720, 725-26 (1981) (Deen, P.J., concurring). In Blount, Presiding
Judge Deen relied on Frye to argue that a jury charge on the accuracy of medical care was
proper because a jury must decide the weight and credibility of expert evidence. 159 Ga.
App. at 86-87, 282 S.E.2d at 725-26. Courts would later use this line of reasoning to affirm
the admissibility of evidence despite the State's failure to satisfy the Harperstandard. See,
e.g., Duncan, 305 Ga. App. at 272, 699 S.E.2d at 345 (holding the appellant's claim that an
officer failed to correctly administer the HGN test affected the weight of the evidence rather
than its admissibility).
39. Harper, 249 Ga. at 525, 292 S.E.2d at 395. For an early discussion of the Harper
standard and its impact on the admissibility of scientific evidence in criminal prosecutions,
see Gregory Hardy, Jr., Evidence, 35 MERCER L. REV. 167 (1983).
40. See Harper, 249 Ga. at 523-24, 292 S.E.2d at 394-95.
41. Id. at 526, 292 S.E.2d at 396. The court compared Harper's statements with the
results of a polygraph test or a hypnotic trance, both of which are generally inadmissible in
Georgia. Id. at 524, 292 S.E.2d at 395.
42. Id. at 525, 292 S.E.2d at 395.
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the procedure in question. 43 Once enough courts have found that a
procedure is verifiably certain to produce reliable results, trial courts
may take judicial notice of the procedure's validity.44 However,
admissibility determinations under Harper must be based on
foundational evidence provided by the State rather than merely relying
on the consensus of the scientific community. 45
Alternatively, courts may take judicial notice that the procedure "rests
upon the laws of nature" and therefore does not require a scientific
foundation. 46 While the court did not specify what evidence is necessary
to show that a procedure rests upon the laws of nature,4 7 courts have held
that a layperson could observe the results of such a procedure without
any specialized knowledge. 48 As such, the State is not required to provide
foundational evidence before a trial court may admit these common-sense
observations into evidence. 49
Harper remains the controlling standard for admitting the results of a
scientific procedure against a defendant in Georgia criminal
prosecutions.50 The Supreme Court of the United States sounded the

death knell for the Frye test in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,5 1 where the court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 70252
superseded Frye as the controlling standard for admissible expert
testimony in federal cases. 53 While the Georgia General Assembly
codified Rule 702 for civil cases, 54 Georgia courts hearing criminal
matters are not bound by Daubert.55 Instead, those courts must utilize

43. Id. at 525-26, 292 S.E.2d at 395-96.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 525, 292 S.E.2d at 395.
47. See id. at 526, 292 S.E.2d at 396.
48. See e.g., Hawkins, 223 Ga. App. at 36, 476 S.E.2d at 807 (holding observations of a
person's physical dexterity "could be as obvious to the layperson as to the expert").

49. See id.
50. Mitchell, 301 Ga. at 565, 801 S.E.2d at 220; Spencer, 302 Ga. at 135, 805 S.E.2d at
888.

51. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
52. FED. R. EvID. 702.
53. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89. Under the rule, expert testimony is only admissible
if it "will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,"
"is based on sufficient facts or data" and on "reliable principles or methods," and "the expert
has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case." FED. R. EVID. 702.
54. See O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(b) (2017).
55. See Carlson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 595, 598, 634 S.E.2d 410, 414 (2006) (stating the
general assembly had not abandoned the Harper standard for criminal cases when it
codified the Daubert standard for civil matters). The current statute replaced, but did not
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Harper's"verifiable certainty" analysis to determine whether a scientific
procedure can reliably produce competent evidence in criminal cases.56
C. The Supreme CourtAdds Integrity to Harper'sGroundwork
In Caldwell v. State,5 7 the Georgia Supreme Court added a second
prong to the Harper analysis. On appeal, Caldwell argued that the trial
court erred by admitting the results of a DNA identification procedure,
specifically that the procedure was not verifiably certain to produce a
positive result. The trial court denied Caldwell's motion to suppress the
results, concluding that the procedures involved in DNA identification
were verifiably certain to produce accurate results. Further, it found that
the testing laboratory conducted the procedure in a scientifically
acceptable manner, and the results were reliable "within a reasonable
degree of scientific certainty."55
The supreme court affirmed, noting that the procedure used to identify
the appellant's DNA, while still relatively novel, was founded on sound
science and verifiably certain to produce reliable results.5 9 However, due
to the novelty of the procedure, the court concluded that it was not
enough that the State prove the procedure was verifiably certain under
Harper.60 Instead, the court stated that the admissibility of the results
also turned on whether the laboratory testing the DNA sample had
substantially performed the identification procedures in an acceptable
manner.6 1 After a lengthy survey of the techniques employed by the
laboratory in testing a suspect's DNA, the court held that the procedures
had been substantially performed and could produce an accurate
identification. 62
Even if the State satisfies the first prong of Harper by showing that a
scientific procedure is verifiably certain to produce reliable results, under
Caldwell the State must also show that the procedure was substantially
performed in an acceptable manner. 63 The trial court is charged with
determining whether the procedure was substantially performed, and
unlike the first prong of Harper, may not simply take judicial notice that

substantially alter, the earlier codification of the Daubert standard as mentioned in
Carlson. Compare O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(b) (2017) with O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(b) (2005).
56. See Carlson, 280 Ga. App. at 598, 634 S.E.2d at 414.
57. 260 Ga. 278, 393 S.E.2d 436 (1990).
58. Id. at 278-79, 393 S.E.2d at 437.
59. Id. at 286-87, 393 S.E.2d at 441-42.
60. Id. at 286-87, 393 S.E.2d at 441.
61. Id. at 287, 393 S.E.2d at 441.
62. See id. at 287-90, 393 S.E.2d at 442-44.
63. Id. at 286-87, 393 S.E.2d at 441-42.
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the procedure has been accepted as accurate. 64 However, it is not
necessary for a trial court to find that the procedure has absolutely no
possibility for error.65 Instead, if the trial court concludes that the
procedure was substantially performed, any possible errors in
administering the procedure go to the weight of the results rather than
their admissibility.66
D. Field Sobriety Testing Strains Harper's Underpinning

1. The Georgia Court of Appeals Weathers Some Early Stress
Tests of the Harper Standard
After the supreme court established the two-pronged Harperanalysis,
the next issue for Georgia's appellate courts was whether to apply the
Harperstandard to field sobriety test results in DUI cases. The National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) developed a battery of
three standard field sobriety tests to aid officers in obtaining probable
cause to arrest a suspect for DUI. 67 These tests-the HGN, walk-andturn, and one-leg stand-are heavily relied upon in obtaining and
affirming DUI convictions. 6 8
Horizontalgaze nystagmus refers to the involuntary jerking of the eyes
as they follow an object moving from side to side, which is purported to
be elicited by alcohol.6 9 Officers administering the HGN look for this
involuntary jerking as they move a pen or flashlight across the suspect's
vision. 70 The walk-and-turn and one-leg stand tests are divided-attention
tests that involve a suspect making certain physical movements as
instructed by an officer. 7 ' According to the NHTSA, both the walk-and64. See Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 456, 458, 448 S.E.2d 177, 179 (1994) (holding the
trial court erred in admitting evidence because it had been admitted in other cases rather
than determining whether the procedure had been substantially performed under
Caldwell).
65. Caldwell, 260 Ga. at 287, 393 S.E.2d at 442.
66. Lattarulo v. State, 261 Ga. 124, 126-27, 401 S.E.2d 516, 519 (1991).
67. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsP., DOT HS 808 839, VALIDATION OF THE STANDARDIZED FIELD
SOBRIETY TEST BATTERY AT BACs BELOW 0.10 PERCENT 33 (Aug. 1998).

68. See generally Hawkins, 223 Ga. App. at 35-39, 476 S.E.2d at 806-09.
69. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 67, at 33.
70. Id. The officer watches for three "clues" in each eye while suspects follow the
stimulus. Id. According to NHTSA, the presence of four or more clues indicate that a
person's blood-alcohol content exceeds the amount necessary to be considered under the
influence. Id.
71. Id. at 33-34. For the walk-and-turn, the officer instructs the subject "to take nine
steps, heel-to-toe, along a straight line." Id. at 33. The suspect must then "turn on one foot
and return in the same manner in the opposite direction." Id. at 33-34. The officer looks for
eight clues-failure to keep balance while listening to instructions, beginning the test
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turn and one-leg stand may be "easily performed by most unimpaired
people," 72 while impaired individuals perform the tests poorly because
their attention is divided between mental and physical tasks. 73
In early post-Harpercases, the Georgia Court of Appeals declined to
reach the question of whether the HGN was subject to a Harper
analysis.7 4 In such cases, the court maintained that any error in failing
to conduct a Harperanalysis was harmless based on the strength of other
evidence supporting the DUI conviction.7 5 However, in Mendoza v.
State,7 6 the issue of whether the HGN constituted a scientific procedure
divided the court in three wildly differing opinions.
In Mendoza, the majority held that it was unnecessary to reach the
issue of whether the HGN was a scientific procedure due to other
evidence supporting the appellant's conviction.77 Presiding Judge Deen
concurred, but wrote separately to argue that, even if the admissibility
7 8 Instead, Judge
issue was reached, the HGN was not subject to Harper.
Deen contended that the results of the HGN could be interpreted by
personal observations, were objective in nature, and did not require
specialized knowledge.7 9 Judge Beasley dissented, reasoning that the
physical reactions elicited by the HGN could only be evaluated with
specialized knowledge, and the State should be required to establish a
foundation for the HGN before its results may be admitted.8 0

before the officer finishes the instructions, stopping while walking to regain balance, not
touching heel-to-toe, stepping off the straight line, using arms for balance, making an
improper turn, and taking an incorrect number of steps. Id. at 34. The one-leg stand test
requires the suspect to "stand with one foot approximately six inches off the ground and
count aloud.. . until told to put the foot down" thirty seconds later. Id. The officer looks for
four clues-if the suspect is "swaying while balancing, using arms to balance, hopping to
maintain balance, [or] putting the foot down" before told to do so. Id.
72. Id. at 33.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Ross v. State, 192 Ga. App. 850, 850, 386 S.E.2d 721, 722 (1989). In Ross,
the court of appeals further rejected the appellant's contention that the HGN was not a
generally accepted procedure because the supreme court had disapproved of the Frye
standard in Harper. Id.

75. See id.
76. 196 Ga. App. 627, 396 S.E.2d 576 (1990).
77. Id. at 628, 396 S.E.2d at 577. Mendoza also performed the "hippus" test, which
involved the officer shining a light into Mendoza's eyes to observe "the contraction or
fixation of the pupils to indicate drug use." Id. As with the HGN, the court declined to reach
the issue of whether the hippus test required foundational support under Harper. Id.
78. Id. at 630, 396 S.E.2d at 578-79 (Deen, P.J., concurring).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 631-32, 396 S.E.2d at 579-80 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
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In Manley v. State,8 1 a unanimous panel sided with Judge Beasley. The
court agreed that the HGN was subject to Harper, and the trial court
erred by not conducting a Harper analysis. 82 However, the court noted
that the trial court properly found that the HGN was a valid indicator of
the presence of alcohol in a suspect's system.88 The court of appeals held
that it was not error to admit the results of the HGN because the State
produced a sufficient foundation, through expert testimony, that it was
verifiably certain within the medical community that the test was a
reliable gauge of intoxication. 84 Further, the court held that any error in
admitting the HGN results was "harmless in light of the other
overwhelming evidence of Manley's guilt." 85

2. The Court of Appeals Shores Up Harper'sFoundation
Later cases involving field sobriety test results reflected an attempted
course correction of the inconsistent application of the Harper standard.
In Hawkins v. State,8 6 the court of appeals endeavored to "make clear"
the extent of Harper's reach regarding field sobriety test results.8 7 In
Hawkins, the appellant argued that none of the results of the three
standardized field sobriety tests were admissible under Harper because
they were not verifiably certain to produce reliable indicators of
impairment.8 8
The court dealt swiftly with two of the appellant's three contentions.
In discussing the walk-and-turn and one-leg-stand tests, the court noted
that observing a suspect's "gross motor skills" was a matter of common
sense and experience and did not require specialized knowledge.8 9
Because the tests could be evaluated through common-sense means, the

81. 206 Ga. App. 281, 424 S.E.2d 818 (1992).
82. Id. at 282, 424 S.E.2d at 820.
83. Id.
84. Id. Specifically, the State's evidence included the following:
[D]etailed expert testimony ... to the effect that the HGN test had reached a
stage of verifiable certainty in the medical community as being an indicator of
something wrong with the central nervous system or the vestibular apparatus
or the eye; that one of the factors that might create horizontal gaze nystagmus
was the presence of alcohol or drugs; and that although the test originated in the
medical community, it was a scientifically reliable field sobriety evaluation.

Id.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
223 Ga. App. 34, 476 S.E.2d 803 (1996).
Id. at 35, 476 S.E.2d at 806.
Id.
Id. at 36, 476 S.E.2d at 807.
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court held that the results of those tests did not require a scientific
90
foundation under Harper.
In contrast, the court confirmed that the HGN was a scientific
procedure due to the complexity required to administer and evaluate the
test. 91 However, echoing its earlier decision in Manley, the court stated
that the HGN had reached a stage of verifiable certainty as a reliable
method of observing intoxication. 92 The court briefly acknowledged, but
did not thoroughly discuss, whether the State must prove that the HGN
had been substantially performed in an acceptable manner. 93 Instead,
the court stated that evidence that the HGN was not substantially
performed may be tendered by a defendant, but such evidence would only
affect the weight of the results.94
In State v. Tousley,9 5 the court tightened the reins on trial courts
allowing the results of the HGN even if the test had not been
substantially performed. In Tousley, the State appealed the exclusion of
HGN results, contending that any error in the administration of the test
did not affect the admissibility of the results.9 While the court of appeals
reversed the exclusion of the HGN results,97 it held that the State must
satisfy both prongs of the Harper analysis because the HGN was a
scientific procedure.9 8 Although the trial court correctly took judicial
notice that the HGN was verifiably certain to produce reliable results,
the court of appeals noted that the State must also show that the HGN
had been substantially performed in an acceptable manner.99
The court ultimately held, based on evidence of the officer's training
and experience in administering the HGN, the trial court erred in
excluding the evidence.1 00 Under Tousley, even if the State provides a
scientific foundation for the results of the HGN test, it must also produce
evidence that the officer followed law enforcement guidelines in
administering the test.101 The trial court may consider such factors as
whether the officer was sufficiently trained and experienced in
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. at 37-38, 476 S.E.2d at 808.
Id.
Id. at 38-39, 476 S.E.2d at 808-09.

94. Id.
95. 271 Ga. App. 874, 611 S.E.2d 139 (2005).
96. Id. at 874, 611 S.E.2d at 141.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 878, 611 S.E.2d at 144.
99. Id. at 880, 611 S.E.2d at 144-45.
100. Id. at 880, 611 S.E.2d at 145-46.
101. See Parker v. State, 307 Ga. App. 61, 63, 704 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2010) (reiterating
the two-step analysis required under Harper and Caldwel).
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administering the test, did so according to standardized techniques, and
properly scored or interpreted the test in making this determination. 102

E. The Romberg Test Puts FurtherStress on the HarperFoundation
While the Romberg test first appeared in the medical field in the early
nineteenth century,10 3 its use as a field sobriety test in Georgia is a recent
phenomenon. 104 In medicine, the test is used to reveal symptoms of
neurosyphilis by observing a patient's posture while the patient's eyes
are closed. 105 Physicians administering the Romberg test look for
symptoms that would not otherwise be present while the patient's eyes
are open, such as a lack of balance. 106 Obstructing the patient's vision
aggravates the symptoms because the obstruction further upsets the
patient's equilibrium.10 7 Prior to Mitchell, the Romberg test was
mentioned sparingly in DUI-related appeals. 108 The opinions in such
cases shed little light on the methodology or significance of the Romberg
test in determining intoxication, as DUI convictions were routinely
affirmed based on the sufficiency of other evidence. 109
More recently, the court of appeals was confronted head-on with the
10 where the appellant contended
Romberg test's validity in Kar v. State,o
that the trial court erred by admitting the results of the Romberg test
without first conducting a Harper analysis."1 However, the court again
side-stepped this contention by holding that any error was harmless due

102. Tousley, 271 Ga. App. at 880, 611 S.E.2d at 145.
103. A. Khasnis & R.M. Gokula, Romberg's Test, J. POSTGRADUATE MED., Apr.-Jun.
2003, at 169.
104. Some of the earliest Georgia cases to mention the Romberg test originated in the
Georgia Court of Appeals in 2002. See Sagenich v. State, 255 Ga. App. 663, 663, 566 S.E.2d
327, 328 (2002) (stating the arresting officer administered "the modified Romberg test,"
among other field sobriety tests); McKee v. State, 258 Ga. App. 99, 100, 572 S.E.2d 740, 742
(2002) (stating the officer administered "the Rhomberg [sic] balance test").
105. Khasnis & Gokula, supranote 103, at 170.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 307 Ga. App. 701, 703, 706 S.E.2d 94, 96 (2011) (noting
that the appellant "was unsteady on his feet and failed to follow all of the instructions" of
the Romberg without discussing the significance of those results).
109. See id.; Campbell v. State, 313 Ga. App. 436, 437 n.2, 721 S.E.2d 649, 651 n.2 (2011)
(noting that the appellant did not exhibit any clues of impairment on the Romberg); Armour
v. State, 315 Ga. App. 745, 746, 728 S.E.2d 270, 271 (2012) (holding the appellant exhibited
eyelid tremors and slow internal clock supported probable cause for arrest without
discussion).
110. 318 Ga. App. 379, 733 S.E.2d 387 (2012).
111. Id. at 379, 733 S.E.2d at 388.

620

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

to the overwhelming evidence of Kar's guilt.1 12 Thus, the question of
whether the Romberg Balance test required a scientific foundation under
Harperwas left for another day. 113
IV. COURT'S RATIONALE

In Mitchell v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court finally answered that
question when it held that, like the HGN, the Romberg test was subject
to the Harperstandard.11 4 While not expressly referred to as an issue of
first impression, the court noted that the question of whether the
Romberg test is subject to Harperwas not answered by the Georgia Court
of Appeals in Kar."15 Writing for a unanimous court,1 6 Justice Boggs" 7
stated the trial court erred by admitting the results of the Romberg test
without first finding that the test had reached a "scientific stage of
verifiable certainty" as an accurate gauge of impairment.118
Justice Boggs noted that a threshold issue in making that
determination is whether the procedure in question deals with "scientific
principles," or if the procedure amounts to more simple matters of skill
and experience.11 9 To determine whether the Romberg test was a
scientific procedure and subject to Harper, Justice Boggs relied on the
line of cases succeeding Harper to decide whether the results of the
Romberg test could be observed by a layperson or, alternatively, if the
results required scientific knowledge to interpret.1 20

112. Id. at 381, 733 S.E.2d at 389. Kar was arrested after a lengthy police pursuit, and
the arresting officer testified that Kar was behaving oddly and had methamphetamine in
his pocket. The officer arrested Kar for DUI based on these factors, as well as Kar's failure
to satisfactorily perform field sobriety tests, including the Romberg. Id. at 381, 733 S.E.2d

at 389-90.
113. See State v. Williams, 337 Ga. App. 791, 794, 788 S.E.2d 860, 863 (2016) (noting
the appellee "successfully completed the Romberg evaluation" without further discussion);
McAllister v. State, 325 Ga. App. 583, 584, 754 S.E.2d 376, 378 (2014) (noting the appellant
stated that "medical problems would prevent him from completing the Romberg
Evaluation, which consisted of silently counting to 30") (internal quotations omitted).
114. Mitchell, 301 Ga. at 567, 802 S.E.2d at 221-22.
115. Id. at 566, 566 n.3, 802 S.E.2d at 221, 221 n.3.
116. Id. at 572, 802 S.E.2d at 225.
117. Id. at 563, 802 S.E.2d at 219.
118. Id. at 567, 802 S.E.2d at 221-22.
119. Id. at 565-66, 802 S.E.2d at 220-21.
120. Id. at 566, 802 S.E.2d at 221. In addition to the line of cases involving DUI evidence,
the supreme court's opinion in Belton v. State, 270 Ga. 671, 512 S.E.2d 614 (1999), provided
further guidance on how to categorize the Romberg test. In Belton, the court analogized the
comparison of shoe prints to observing a suspect performing field sobriety tests such as the
walk-and-turn. Id. at 674, 512 S.E.2d at 617. The court rejected the appellant's argument
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Ultimately, Justice Boggs likened the Romberg test to the HGN,
stating that the possible indicators of impairment found by
administering the test could not be seen by a lay observer. 121 Justice
Boggs stated that the significance of eyelid tremors and the effects of
alcohol consumption on a person's internal clock are beyond common
sense, and that a layperson could not accurately determine whether a
five-second deviation of a person's internal clock constitutes
impairment. 22 He further noted that various iterations of the Romberg
test found in other jurisdictions did not reflect the same name, elements,
evidentiary significance, or methodology, or even if it is "a recognized
field sobriety test."1 23 Thus, the trial court erred by not conducting a
Harper analysis, either by examining expert testimony or otherwise,
before admitting the Romberg test results into evidence.1 24
V. IMPLICATIONS

A. Is the Romberg Test Too Unstable to Satisfy the HarperStandard?
Under Mitchell v. State, trial courts cannot simply admit the results of
a Romberg test unvetted.1 25 The trial court must examine testimony,
exhibits, treatises, or cases in other jurisdictions to determine if the
Romberg test satisfies the first prong of the Harper standard.1 26 In
Mitchell, the Fayetteville police officer who administered the Romberg
test provided the only testimony regarding the Romberg test, and his
knowledge of the test was not based on any scientific foundation.1 27 On
appeal, the State provided a journal article to support its assertion that
the Romberg test was a valid procedure under Harper v. State.128 While
the article listed various symptoms that could indicate a positive result
under the Romberg test, the court noted that this article did not indicate
29
the Romberg test was used to observe impairment.1

that comparing shoe prints to "external physical characteristics of particular shoes"
required scientific knowledge. Id.
121. Mitchell, 301 Ga. at 567, 802 S.E.2d at 221-22.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 567 n.5, 802 S.E.2d at 222 n.5.
124. Id. at 567, 802 S.E.2d at 222.
125. See id. at 565, 802 S.E.2d at 220.
126. Harper, 249 Ga. at 525-26, 292 S.E.2d at 395-96.
127. Mitchell, 301 Ga. at 567, 802 S.E.2d at 221.
128. Id. at 567 n.4, 802 S.E.2d at 221 n.4; see Brief of the Appellee on Behalf of the State
of Georgia, Mitchell, 301 Ga. 563, 802 S.E.2d 217 (2017) (No. S17A0459), 2016 WL 7410178,
at *10 n.7.
129. Mitchell, 301 Ga. at 567 n.4, 802 S.E.2d at 221 n.4; see Khasnis & Gokula, supra
note 103, at 172.
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Because the State must now provide a foundation that the Romberg
test has reached a scientific stage of verifiable certainty under Mitchell,
the trial court must decide whether that foundation supports the validity
of the Romberg test as a means of observing a suspect's intoxication. 130
To do so, the State must offer evidence verifying its reliability, such as
studies supporting the accuracy of the Romberg test in gauging
intoxication or medical testimony on how to administer the test. 131 The
lack of consistent evidence that would allow the State to satisfy Harper
hinders its ability to enter evidence derived from the Romberg test
against a criminal defendant. 132 It also hinders the court's ability to take
judicial notice of the Romberg test to satisfy the first prong of Harper.133
The Romberg test is not included in the three-test battery constituting
the "standard" field sobriety tests developed by the NHTSA,134 nor is it
taught in Georgia's P.O.S.T. training programs for police officers. 135 As
130. Mitchell, 301 Ga. at 567, 802 S.E.2d at 221-22.
131. See id. at 567, 802 S.E.2d at 221 (stating the officer did not know of any studies
validating the Romberg "like there are for the other three tests," and the State presented
no further scientific support for the Romberg); cf. Spencer, 302 Ga. at 138, 805 S.E.2d at
890 (stating the officer's knowledge of measuring a specific blood-alcohol content was based
on "police training" but not "medical, physiological, or other specialist training").
132. Cf. Jefferson v. State, 312 Ga. App. 842, 844, 720 S.E.2d 184, 188 (2011). In
Jefferson, the court of appeals held that the State failed to demonstrate that "fracture
match analysis"-a procedure used to match a piece of duct tape to a tape roll in the
appellant's car-had been "founded on valid scientific principles." Id. A microanalyst for
the Georgia Bureau of Investigation testified as to how the procedure was performed. Id. at
845-46, 720 S.E.2d at 189. However, she failed to offer other support for the verifiable
certainty of the procedure. Id. at 848, 720 S.E.2d at 190. Further, the State presented
caselaw from other jurisdictions that did not conclusively support the verifiable certainty
of the procedure. Id. at 845, 720 S.E.2d at 189.
133. Cf. Bravo v. State, 304 Ga. App. 243, 248 n.16, 696 S.E.2d 79, 83 n.16 (2010)
(holding the trial court erred in relying solely on one appellate case to conclude that the
HGN had reached a scientific stage of verifiable certainty as a reliable means of estimating
the specific blood-alcohol content of a DUI suspect).
134. While the NHTSA has previously included the Romberg test in its Drug
Recognition Expert training, recent versions of the NHTSA's training guidelines do not
include the Romberg test. Compare NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DRUG

EVALUATION AND CLASSIFICATION TRAINING, sess. IV, at 5 (2011) (including the Romberg
among the standard "divided attention" tests such as the walk-and-turn and one-leg stand)
with NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DWI DETECTION AND STANDARDIZED FIELD

SOBRIETY TESTING, Sess. 7, at 11(2015) [hereinafter SFST] (omitting the Romberg from the
battery of divided-attention tests).
135. See State v. Sanders, 274 Ga. App. 393, 395, 617 S.E.2d 633, 635 (2005) (stating
the officer conceded at trial that Georgia's P.O.S.T. certification only taught the standard
three-test battery). P.O.S.T., Georgia's "Peace Officer Standards and Training Counsel,"
provides training on various aspects of law enforcement, including field sobriety testing.
See GEORGIA PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING COUNCIL, https://www.gapost.org/
(last visited Nov. 14, 2017).
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Justice Boggs noted in Mitchell, courts in other jurisdictions have wildly
differing precedent as to the administration, evaluation, or purpose of the
Romberg test. 136 In the medical field, the Romberg test has been used to
detect various medical conditions; 137 however, the accuracy of evaluating
intoxication via the Romberg test is questionable at best. 138 Therefore, it
is unlikely that trial courts will be able to rely on any consistent
foundational evidence when deciding whether to admit the Romberg
test's results. 139
Even if a trial court could take judicial notice of the Romberg test, the
State would still need to satisfy the second prong of Harper.140 While the
supreme court did not discuss the second prong of Harper in Mitchell,141
State v. Tousley gives some guidance as to what the State must show to
satisfy both aspects of the Harper analysis. Just as the State must show
that an officer substantially performed the HGN in an acceptable
manner, such as testimony that the officer followed the NHTSA's
training in administering the test, 142 it must also show the same for the
Romberg test. However, because there is currently no standardized
method of administering the Romberg test, 143 it will be difficult for courts
to decide whether an officer administered the test correctly.
B. Is the Georgia Supreme Court Fortifying the Evidentiary Standard in
DUI Cases?
While the Georgia Supreme Court's holding in Mitchell may seem
inconsequential on its own, it indicates a shift in the way that the high
court views field sobriety testing. Although courts have previously turned

136. See, e.g., Gradford v. Hunstville, 557 So. 2d 1330, 1331 (Ala. 1989) (stating the
officer administered the "Romberg alphabet test"); People v. Carlson, 677 P.2d 310, 316 n.6
(Colo. 1984) (citing to continuing legal education materials that describe the Romberg as
involving a suspect counting for twenty seconds rather than thirty).
137. See Khasnis & Gokula, supra note 103, at 172.
138. The National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), a collection
of studies compiled by the Center for Disease Control (CDC), noted that the Romberg test
was designed to identify problems with a person's balance, but not "to diagnose the cause
of a particular balance problem." NAT'L HEALTH AND NUTRITION EXAMINATION SURY.,
BALANCE PROCEDURES MANUAL 13 (2001).

139. Cf. Jefferson, 312 Ga. App. at 845, 720 S.E.2d at 189 (stating caselaw of other
jurisdictions was not consistent on the verifiable certainty of fracture match analysis).
140. Cf. Tousley, 271 Ga. App. at 878, 720 S.E.2d at 144 (holding the HGN, as a scientific
procedure, is subject to both prongs of Harper).
141. See Mitchell, 301 Ga. at 567, 802 S.E.2d at 221-22.
142. Tousley, 271 Ga. App. at 880, 611 S.E.2d at 144-45.
143. See SFST, supra note 134, sess. 7, at 11.
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to other evidence of a suspect's intoxication to affirm convictions,1 44
recent supreme court decisions have attempted to tame the wild west of
DUI law by applying harsher scrutiny to certain types of evidence. Two
recent cases decided after Mitchell challenged the court's willingness to
question evidence used to convict defendants of DUI.
In Spencer v. State,145 another unanimous opinionl4 6 authored by
Justice Boggs,1 47 the supreme court held that the State failed to prove
the HGN could reliably establish that a person's blood-alcohol content
was above a certain number.1 48 While the HGN test has reached a
scientific stage of verifiable certainty with regard to whether a suspect is
impaired by alcohol,1 49 the court noted that whether a suspect's bloodalcohol level had reached a certain number was a separate, unsettled
issue under Harper and its progeny. 50 Therefore, it held that the trial
court abused its discretion when it found that the results of the HGN
could accurately measure a suspect's blood-alcohol content without first
conducting a Harperanalysis.1 5
In Olevik v. State,152 the court held that article I, section 1, paragraph
XVI of the Georgia Constitution 58 protects citizens from being compelled
to take a breath test that could produce incriminatory evidence in DUI
cases.1 54 The court reasoned that requiring a suspect to provide "deep
lung air" for several seconds, an unnatural type of breathing, compels
that suspect to perform an incriminating act. 5 5 While the court
previously held in Klink v. State15 6 that a suspect had no constitutional
right to refuse a breath test under Georgia's implied consent law,15 7 Klink
and its progeny were overruled to the extent that they provided no

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
48, 696
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
at 520.
157.

See, e.g., Kar, 318 Ga. App. at 381, 733 S.E.2d at 389-90.
302 Ga. 133, 805 S.E.2d 886 (2017).
Id. at 139, 805 S.E.2d at 890.
Id. at 133, 805 S.E.2d at 887.
Id. at 138-39, 805 S.E.2d at 890.
Hawkins, 223 Ga. App. at 37-38, 476 S.E.2d at 808; Bravo, 304 Ga. App. at 247S.E.2d at 83.
Spencer, 302 Ga. at 135-36, 805 S.E.2d at 888.
Id. at 138-39, 805 S.E.2d at 890.
302 Ga. 228, 806 S.E.2d 505 (2017).
GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 16.
Olevik, 302 Ga. at 228, 806 S.E.2d at 508-09.
Id. at 244, 806 S.E.2d at 518-19.
272 Ga. 605, 533 S.E.2d 92 (2000), overruled by Olevik, 302 Ga. at 246, 806 S.E.2d
Id. at 606, 533 S.E.2d at 94.
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protection against compelling a suspect to perform a breath test under
the state constitution. 158
VI. CONCLUSION
In Mitchell v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court presented the State
with an additional obstacle in its attempt to prove the intoxication of a
defendant charged with DUI. Because a trial court must find the
Romberg Balance test has reached a scientific stage of verifiable
certainty under Harper v. State,15 9 the State must proffer evidence that
the Romberg test is verifiably certain to produce results that accurately
gauge intoxication.1 6 0 Further, under Caldwell v. State, the State must
also prove that the officer administering the Romberg test substantially
performed the procedure in an acceptable manner.1 61
Unless the State satisfies both prongs of the Harper standard,
prosecutors will be unable to use the results of the Romberg test against
a DUI defendant. 162 While courts may still be able to find sufficient
evidence of a defendant's intoxication based on other factors, such as how
the defendant performed the field sobriety tests,1 63 Mitchell began a
trend toward applying more scrutiny to the way trial courts treat
evidence in DUI cases. More recent opinions of the court evidence this
level of scrutiny,1 6 4 and shift more toward protecting a defendant's rights
in DUI prosecutions than ensuring their convictions will withstand
appeal.

Eric F. Kramer

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
S.E.2d

Olevik, 302 Ga. at 246, 806 S.E.2d at 520.
Mitchell, 301 Ga. at 567, 802 S.E.2d at 221-22.
Cf. Tousley, 271 Ga. App. at 878, 611 S.E.2d at 144.
See id. at 880, 611 S.E.2d at 144-45.
See Mitchell, 301 Ga. at 567, 802 S.E.2d at 221-22.
See, e.g., Kar, 318 Ga. App. at 381, 733 S.E.2d at 389-90.
See Spencer, 302 Ga. at 138-39, 805 S.E.2d at 890; Olevik, 302 Ga. at 244, 806
at 518-19.
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